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Abstract: 
 
The concept of embeddedness plays a central role in the segment of economic 
sociology and social theory which is inspired by the works of Karl Polanyi. But to the 
extent that embeddedness is understood in a substantialist manner,  implying the 
existence of a unitary lifeworld,  the desire for embeddedness  is an impossible 
aspiration under modern conditions.  Throughout the modern era it is however 
possible to observe the emergence of complex societal stabilization mechanisms, 
which serve as substitutes to traditional forms of embeddedness. The emergence of 
function specific cultures, in the form of, for example, legal, political and scientific 
cultures, establishing a ‘second nature’ in the Hegelian sense, is one example of 
this.  Other examples are (neo-)corporatist  institutions which fulfilled a central 
stabilising role in classical modernity and the kind of network based governance 
arrangements which fulfil a similar position in today’s radicalised modernity. 
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I.   Introduction 
The differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung) of a whole range of more or less 
autonomous functionally-delineated social spheres, fields or systems, such as law, 
the mass media, science, politics, education and the economy is one of the central 
characteristics of modernity. One of the many consequences of the move towards a 
relative pre-dominance of functional differentiation as the central organising principle 
of society is that modern society is characterised by a multiplicity of social contexts, 
roles, expectations and practices. Thus, the aspiration, associated with Karl Polanyi-
inspired sociology, concerning a possible reestablishment of embeddedness is an 
impossible desire under the structural condition of modernity. That is especially the 
case if the term “embeddedness” is understood in a substantialist manner, in the 
sense that social practices are only understood as being embedded when they are 
unfolded within a unitary lifeworld. 
Throughout the modern era, it is, however, possible to observe the 
emergence of a number of functional equivalents to the substantialist pre-modern 
kind of embeddedness in the form of complex stabilisation mechanisms within the 
functional differentiated structures of the modern society. Examples of such 
mechanisms are function-specific cultures, in the form of, for example, legal, political 
and scientific cultures. Such phenomena serve as internal stabilisation mechanisms 
within functionally-differentiated structures. It is also possible to observe the 
emergence of complex organisational forms and regimes which stand transverse to 
the functional-differentiated structures of society, and which have the stabilisation of 
relations between functionally-differentiated structures as their central task. In the 
classical “state-centred” modernity, which, with a couple of symbolic dates, can be 
said to span the period between 1789 and 1989, (neo-) corporatist structures were 
the primary form for such stabilisation in Western Europe. In the radical modernity of 
today, governance structures relying on the network form fulfil a similar role on an 
(almost) global scale. 
However, neither in the classical, nor in the radicalised, modernity did such 
structures produce embeddedness in a pre-modern substantialist sense. Instead, 
they merely produce(d) stabilisation between abstract, generalised and highly 
complex – and, as such, “dis-embedded” - structures. This insight also seems to be 5 
 
guiding post-Polanyian economic sociology in so far as a “non-atomistic” approach is 
advocated at the same time as holistic approaches are avoided.
1
 
  Under the 
structural conditions of modernity, the endeavour of “re-establishing embeddeness” 
is only viable if it is translated into the attempt to maintain the autonomy of 
functional-differentiated spheres through mechanisms capable of reducing 
asymmetries, negative externalities and crowding-out effects between such spheres, 
as well as through the definition of the adequate social roles and the entrance criteria 
which guide the access to these roles within each functionally-differentiated sphere 
of society. 
II.   The End of Pre-Modern Embeddedness 
In an ideal-type manner, pre-modern Europe can be understood as being mainly 
characterised by a stratificatory form of social differentiation, in the sense that one of 
its key characteristic was the institutionalisation of hierarchically-ordered differences. 
This primacy of stratificatory differentiation did not exclude the existence of 
functionally-delineated forms of problem-solving through the stabilisation of different 
roles, situations and interests, but such forms mainly emerged as internal forms of 
stabilisation within the hierarchically-organised stratificatory structures constituted by 
the nobility, the clergy, traders, craftsmen and peasants.
2
  Thus, functionally-
differentiated forms mainly played a complementary role. This was also the case for 
the distinction between the centre and the periphery, which served as a form for the 
internal stabilisation of the higher strata, which enabled them to interact with equals 
within the larger European space.
3
In pre-modern Europe, it was thus possible to observe a multitude of 
autonomous and geographically-overlapping societal structures,  for example, in 
terms of principalities, trade regimes, the church and the cities, which all had their 
 
                                                 
1
   See, in particular, M. Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”, 
(1985) 91 The American Journal of Sociology, pp. 481–510. 
2
   For the example of trade, see M. Weber, Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter: Schriften 
1889 – 1894, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, [1889] 2008). For the latest level of research, see, also, the special 
issue on the law merchant in (2004) 5 Chicago Journal of International Law. 
3
   N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), p. 663 et seq. 6 
 
distinct features and which all produced overlapping but, nonetheless, distinct, 
normative orders. A common feature for all of these structures was, however, that 
they relied on the household institution as the central structural coupling, which 
ensured the link between the different strata, in so far as the household structure 
stood in an orthogonal relationship to the stratified structures of society.
4
A key feature of the household institution was, moreover, that it did not allow 
for any clear-cut distinction between economic reproduction and other forms of 
societal operations. Thus, only when the household institution ceased to be a central 
societal category, due to the emergence of a distinct property-based and contract-
based form of economic reproduction, was it possible to understand the economic 
system as a distinct societal category.
  In this 
sense, the household institution was the single most important structure for the 
integration of society in pre-modern Europe. 
5
Against this background, the kind of embeddedness of economic reproduction 
to which Polanyi refers, namely, one in which economic reproduction and the 
societal reproduction of, for example, religion, intimate relations and education are 
intrinsically intertwined, in the sense that no distinction between the praxis of the 
different forms of reproduction is made, must be understood as a distinct pre-modern 
form of embeddedness. 
 
It can, however, be argued that Polanyi’s analysis of the challenge to 
embeddedness, through an unleashing of a specific capitalist logic, which he dates 
to the liberalisation of the British labour market in the 1830s,
6
                                                 
4
   Ibid., p. 695 et seq; see, also “Haus”, pp. 1007–1020, and “Haushalt”, pp. 1020–1021, in: Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Band 3, (Basel-Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co Verlag, 1974). 
 is somewhat narrow, in 
the sense that the end of embeddedness through the break-down of the household 
institution was, by no means, a phenomenon which merely unfolded in relation to the 
praxis of economic reproduction. Instead, the differentiation of a specific economic 
logic was part of a broader process, leading to the break-through of modernity, which 
cannot be reduced to the question of the form of economic reproduction. This is also 
5
   N. Luhmann, Recht der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993), p. 446 et seq. 
6
   Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, (Boston MA: 
Beacon Press, [1944] 2001), p. 84. 7 
 
exemplified by the fact that the state, and not the economy, was the first dis-
embedded sphere of society. The modern state is, in contrast to pre-modern forms of 
rule, a distinct and abstract legal person, which is separate from its members. The 
modern sovereign state is a structure of generalised and impersonal rule, in the 
sense that all rules apply to all persons within a given territory. It is a form of rule 
which only requires a minimum of communication towards its subjects, and only in a 
form which refers to specific roles which are unfolded within specific settings.
7
 The 
constitutional structures of modern states can, therefore, only be understood as dis-
embedded structures.
8
Thus, not only the emergence of a modern economy, but also modern 
statehood, implied a break with the household institution, through the introduction of 
a distinction between the possessions of  the state, and the possessions of the 
monarch, with a dis-embedment of the exercise of political power as the 
consequence. 
 
Moreover, the central mechanism triggering the European state-building 
processes of early modernity was the military revolutions which unfolded from the 
Sixteenth century onwards.
9
                                                 
7
   U.K. Preuss, “Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood. Is Global Constitutionalism a Promising 
Concept?”, in: P. Dobner & M. Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutional Law:  Demise of 
Transformation?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
  These revolutions increasingly made functionally-
delineated and hierarchical-organised political, legal and bureaucratic structures a 
defining feature of society, in so far as the result was a mutually re-inforcing 
configurative relationship between the bureaucratic organisation of military 
capabilities, the structuring of territory, and increases in available economic 
resources, thereby leading to a co-evolutionary differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung) of 
functionally-delineated spheres of society within areas such as law, politics and the 
economy. In addition, the mercantilist economies of the early modern era were state-
economies, in the sense that the social construction of what later became the “free 
8
   J. Tully, “The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy”, pp. 315–338, in: N. Walker & M. 
Loughlin (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 318. 
9
   For overviews and paradigmatic texts, see M. Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660, (Belfast: Boyd, 
1956); C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
1990); J.A. Black: A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800, (London-
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). 8 
 
market” was, to a large extent, a process initiated by the state, just as the central 
organisational feature of the emerging industrial economy was the adaptation of the 
modern model of bureaucratic organisation, which had been developed within the 
realm of the emerging states, as the key feature of modern firms.
10
To sum up, not only is the economic sphere not the only societal sphere 
which has undergone a process of dis-embedment, but it is also not the most central 
sphere if one seeks to understand the central driving forces leading to modernity. Or, 
to express it differently, Marx was wrong when he sought to turn Hegel upside down 
through his emphasis of economic structures, rather than the state, as the central 
mechanism of societal evolution in modernity.
 
11
This argument can, moreover, be extended, since not just politics, law and the 
economy became distinct functionally-delineated spheres of society in the process 
leading to modernity. Instead, a multiplicity of functional-delineated structures 
emerged, in so far as areas such as science, art, intimate relations, health, sports, 
the mass media and education also emerged as distinct spheres of meaning 
(Sinnwelten) characterised by distinctly different social codes and norms.
 
12
                                                 
10
  P.F. Kjaer: “Post-Hegelian Networks: Comments on the Chapter by Simon Deakin”, pp. 75–85, in: M. 
Amstutz & G. Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation,  (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009), pp. 80 et seq. 
  As a 
consequence hereof, a multiplicity of roles emerged, in so far as the inclusion of 
human subjects in a given societal context became conditioned by their alignment 
with context-specific social roles. Subjects became consumers, pupils, citizens, 
patients, employees, and so forth. Thus, dis-embeddedness can also be understood 
as a reflection of a more fundamental fragmentation of meaning (Sinn) structures 
through which holistic universes, such as the household structure, are broken down 
and replaced with a multi-contextual setting, in which the form of meaning differs 
from context to context. 
11
  K. Marx & F. Engels: “Ludvig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie”, pp. 
262-307, in: Marx & Engels. Werke, band 21, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, [1888] 1975), p. 293. 
12
  For an historical overview of the evolution of the differentiation of functional systems, see R. Stichweh, 
“Strukturbildung in der Weltgesellschaft –  Die Eigenstrukturen der Weltgesellschaft und die 
Regionalkulturen der Welt”, in: T. Schwinn (ed), Die Vielfalt und Einheit der Moderne. Kultur-  und 
strukturvergleichende Analysen,  (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp. 239-257;  R. 
Stichweh, “Das Konzept der Weltgesellschaft: ‘Genese und Strukturbildung eines globalen 
Gesellschaftssystems’”, pp. 329–355, in: Rechtstheorie, Sonderheft, Heft 2-3, 2008. 9 
 
Not surprisingly modernity therefore implied a problematication of what human 
subjects are. The positive reply, often aligned with a Kantian tradition, was the 
specifically modern concept of the individual and the process of individualisation. A 
concept, which served as a tool of de-paradoxialisation  in so far as its central 
function is to “cover up” the death of the subject
 
as a unitary figure as brought about 
by the transformation of human subjects into carriers of a multiplicity of social roles.
13
 
The emergence of highly-complex social codes, expectations and norms inherent to 
each role was, moreover, conditioned by a “civilising process” which, through the 
deployment of disciplinary mechanisms, re-created the human subjects in a manner 
which made it possible to align them with the specific roles of modern society.
14
 In 
this sense, the move from the concept of the human subject to the concept of the 
single individual must be understood as being inherently connected to the shift from 
“nature” to “culture” which Kant diagnosed as a central element of the modern 
world.
15
On the other hand, the shadow side of the fragmentation of meaning 
structures was already problematisised  by Rousseau, who sought to develop a 
concept capable of retaining the perceived qualities of the “embedded” pre-modern 
polis under the condition of modernity,
 
16
 and Hegel, who was the first to combine the 
concept of modernity with a concept of critique systematically.
17
                                                 
13
  N. Luhmann, note 3 supra, p. 1024 et seq & 1066 et seq. For a paradigmatic overview of the discussion, see, 
also, A. Heller, “Death of the Subject”, (1990) 25 Thesis Eleven, pp. 22–38. 
  From these two 
scholars, a multitude of links can be established to, for example, Kierkegaard 
(existential fear), Marx (alienation), Weber (rationalisation), Durkheim (anomie), 
Adorno and Horkheimer (reification), Elias and Foucault (disciplination) and 
Habermas (colonialisation). 
14
  See N. Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, Band 1, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [1938] 1976), and 
idem, Die höfische Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [1969] 2002). 
15
  G. Harste, “Kant und Luhmann über Teleologie in politischer Kommunikation und Natur”, pp. 169–83, in: 
idem, T. Mertens & T. Scheffer (eds), Immanuel Kant über Natur und Gesellschaft,  (Odense: Odense 
University Press, 1996). 
16
  J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contract Social ou Principes du Droit Politique, (Paris: Hachette Litteratures, [1762] 
2005). 
17
  J. Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen,  (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1985), p. 13–58. 10 
 
Hence, the concept of dis-embeddedness is one of many concepts which deal 
with the dark side of modernity. Distilling the core insights of the various approaches, 
one can, moreover, conclude that dis-embeddedness must be understood as an 
inescapable condition of modernity, just as modernity must be conceptualised in a 
paradoxical manner, in so far as it sets the individual free at the same time as it 
makes him or her an object of the “social engineering” through which the human 
subject is purposefully recreated.
18
 
 
III.   Equivalents to Embeddedness in Classical Modernity 
Hegel, a contemporary observer of the break-through of modernity, was not only the 
first to understand critique as an inherent element of the concept of modernity, but 
was also the first to conceptualise modern society as a pre-dominantly functional-
differentiated society. Under the influence of the economic studies of David Ricardo 
and Adam Smith, he was also the first to problematise the socio-economic aspect of 
the end to embeddedness systematically.
19
Hegel’s answer was the all-encompassing rational and sovereign (welfare-) 
state. This answer was derived from his conceptualisation of functional, stratificatory 
and territorial differentiation as three independent forms of differentiation which stand 
in an orthogonal relationship to each other, and which enabled him to develop a 
three-dimensional concept of the state. Firstly, he understood the state as being 
composed of the legal and the political system in the “narrow sense”, that is, of 
functionally-delineated structures such as the government, the state bureaucracy 
and the courts. Secondly, he understood the state as an entity composing society as 
a whole. This concept of the “larger state” relied on corporatist structures 
(Kooporationen), framed by socio-economic constitutions, which reflected the social 
 Thus, the central question for Hegel was 
the question of how society could remain integrated under the condition of the 
(relative) primacy of functional differentiation and a capitalist economy. 
                                                 
18
  For the relation of mutual increase between freedom and disciplination, see, in particular, Michel Foucault: 
“The Subject and Power”, in: H. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (eds), Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, (Chicago IL: Chicago University Press, 1982), pp. 208–226. 
19
  G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechtsoder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im 
Grundrisse, Werke Band 7, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [1821] 1970), § 235–246, especially § 244. 11 
 
classes of the emerging industrial society. Thirdly, the state was conceptualised as a 
container constituting itself through the delineation of one state towards other states. 
Thus, Hegel did not open the path to a return to a pre-modern form of embedded 
social praxis on the basis of pre-modern morality (Sittlichkeit), but, instead, 
emphasised the integrative force of the rational state as the appropriate functional 
equivalent under the condition of modernity.
20
At first glance, Hegel’s concept of  the absorption of society in the state, 
developed in the first decades of the Nineteenth century, is a useful starting-point for 
a description of how the emergence of new forms of stratification triggered the 
development of complex corporatist regimes, operating upon the basis of the 
distinctions between employers and employees and capital and labour, in most 
(Western) European countries in the late Nineteenth century and throughout much of 
the Twentieth century. The fundamental function of the corporatist regimes was the 
stabilisation of the relationship between the social classes of the industrial society. 
Not surprisingly, the economic system and the labour market were, therefore, at the 
centre of the corporatist regimes. Although the “variety of capitalism”, as it emerged 
within the framework of national structures, led to substantial differences in the 
organisational forms, a common feature of the European corporatist regimes was, 
however, that they reached beyond  the economic system, in the sense that the 
triangular relationship between the state, employers and employees served as the 
centre of co-ordination for the emerging, and far larger, welfare-state conglomerates. 
Thus, within national frames, corporatism bound together a multitude of 
organisations, which all relied on stratificatory differentiation as their central 
exclusion/inclusion mechanism, and which were attached to all functional systems; 
for example, from the form of political parties within the political system, newspapers 
within the mass-media system, schools within the education system, hospitals within 
the health system, to sports clubs within the area of sports. In this sense, the 
emergence of corporatist structures provided a counter-movement to the increased 
functional-differentiation of the overall structures of society, thereby providing an 
essential contribution to the stabilisation of economic operations within the larger 
 
                                                 
20
  Ibid., § 241–242. 12 
 
societal realm, and thus to the integration of society in a manner which, from an 
overall perspective, was in accordance with the Hegelian vision. 
The Hegelian position is, however, conceptually problematical in so far as he 
did not, in practice, refer to territorial and stratificatory differentiation as constants 
emerging upon the basis of an independent logic, but sees them precisely as the 
“side effects” of the break-through of modernity, due to an increased reliance on 
functional differentiation. When he referred to stratificatory differentiation, he was not 
explicitly referring to structures which are similar to pre-modern stratificatory 
structures, but, instead, to the modern form of stratification between social classes 
(conceptualised as the agricultural, the business, and the bureaucracy class), which 
was the result of the kind of modern capitalist economy which represents one of the 
central expressions of the increased reliance on functional differentiation.
21
 Territorial 
differentiation is also understood by Hegel as an explicitly modern phenomenon 
which is the result of the emergence of a modern society.
22
An alternative is offered by modern systems theory. One  of the central 
insights of systems theory is that stratificatory and territorial differentiation cannot be 
understood as independent forms of differentiation. Functional differentiation can be 
defined as expressing an equality of difference in so far as different spheres of 
society reproduces different functions without any of these spheres taking up a 
 These shortcomings are, 
moreover, re-inforced by the conceptual contradictions inherent in the three-
dimensional concept of the state. A concept which is based upon the fundamental 
distinction (Leitdistinktion) between state and society (Staat und Gesellschaft), at the 
same time as this distinction is supposed to be rescinded through the state. Hegel 
was never capable of dissolving this paradox, and it thus remains unclear how the 
unity of the three forms of the state is constituted. Nonetheless, large segments of 
contemporary comparative politics and welfare state research, more or less 
consciously, continue to rely on a worldview which is strikingly similar, if not identical, 
to the Hegelian position. 
                                                 
21
  S. Avineri, Hegel´s Theory of the Modern State, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, [1972] 1995), p. 
155 et seq. 
22
  G.W.F. Hegel, Die Verfassung Deutschlands [1800 – 1802], Werke 1, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1970), pp. 451–610. 13 
 
superior position vis-à-vis other spheres.
23
 In this process, the specific modern form 
of territorial differentiation emerged as an internal form of stabilisation within each 
sphere through the development of territorially-based political sub-systems and 
territorially-based legal sub-systems, just as other systems, such as the systems of 
economy, health, sports, art and science, to a high extent, came to rely on 
organisational forms and regimes which operated within territorially-defined frames. 
For example, firms and university systems maintained a strong national outlook, 
thereby enabling the emergence of a semantic of “national economies” and specific 
nationally-embedded institutional forms and practices of science.
24
Thus, although the legal and political complex might be understood as 
enjoying a “privileged position”,
 
25
The same insight is valid in relation to stratificatory differentiation, in so far as 
stratification can only be understood as context-specific forms of stabilisation 
emerging within specific  functional areas. Thus, the question of inclusion and 
exclusion, as well as the question of social justice, is thereby transformed into a 
  the structures which are normally dubbed as 
nation-states cannot be understood as merely representing the sum of the legal and 
the political systems, or as structures in which other societal structures are 
succumbed to the primacy of the political system. Instead, they are structures 
consisting of a dense web of mutually re-inforcing and partly overlapping structural 
couplings between the functional sub-systems of, apart from law and politics, the 
systems of economy, education, science, health, sports and so forth. Sub-systems, 
which are not necessarily delineated along completely identical territorial lines, but 
which, in most cases, are characterised by strong overlaps between the territorial 
delineations to which they refer. Such overlaps do not, however, change the fact that 
such territorial delineations remain as internal system boundaries, and are not 
overall frames capable of constituting closed units. 
                                                 
23
  N. Luhmann, note 3 supra, p. 743 et seq. 
24
  For example, for science, see R. Stichweh, The Institutional Structure of the German University, Working 
Paper, University of Lucerne, 08, 2007. Available at: http://www.unilu.ch/files/the-institutional-structure-of-
the-german-university.pdf. 
25
  De facto, Luhmann represents the position that law and politics, in terms of societal function, enjoy a 
privileged position in so far as they produce compatabilisation of the time structures of society in its entirety 
(“gesamtgesellschaftlichen Zeitausgleichs”). See N. Luhmann, note 5 supra, p. 429. 14 
 
question of access to specific roles, which cannot be explained upon the basis of a 
reductionist economistic approach in which social justice is reduced to a question of 
money:
26
  the bohemian artist might not have any money but might still have 
privileged access to the sphere of art, just as the not so well-off factory worker might 
be superior to the bourgeois on the football field. The concept of social inequality 
must, therefore, be replaced with a multi-contextual concept of inclusion and 
exclusion.
27
Another central systems theoretical insight is the impossibility of assuming the 
existence of a singular state-embedded national culture.
 
28
 Instead, it is possible to 
observe a multitude of mutually re-inforcing and overlapping cultures in the form of, 
for example, national legal cultures, national political cultures, national science 
cultures and – within the economy – the specific praxis of “doing business”. Apart 
from serving as “reservoirs” of knowledge, and thus as a basis for learning, such 
cultures also act as “internal environments” of the respective functional systems, in 
the sense that they frame the horizons which are taken into account in the continued 
selection of operations, thereby serving as stabilisation mechanisms which reduce 
the volatility of societal reproduction. They rely on “fictional semantics”, in the form 
of, for example, foundational myths and the social constructions of languages, 
traditions and “vested interests”, which are specific to each sphere of society. They 
are abstract constructions, or, in Hegelian terms, “second natures”,
29
  which, 
nonetheless, remain “real”, in the sense that they have real effects in terms of which 
forms of communications are being included and which are being excluded.
30
                                                 
26
  For the move from stratification to roles, see, in particular, R. Dahrendorf, Soziale Klassen und 
Klassenkonflikt in der industriellen Gesellschaft, (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1957), and idem., Homo 
Sociologicus. Ein Versuch zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der Kategorie der sozialen Rolle.  16. 
Auflage mit einem neuen Vorwort, (Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, [1965] 2006). 
 They 
serve as frames for the production of societal trust within their respective societal 
spheres, and, as such, provide a contribution to the internal stability of such 
27
  N. Luhmann, “Inklusion und Exklusion”, in: idem. Soziologische Aufklärung, Band 6, Die Soziologie und 
der Mensch, (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), pp. 237–264. 
28
  For the opposite perspective, see U. Haltern, Was bedeutet Souveränität?, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
29
  G.W.F. Hegel, note 19 supra, § 4. 
30
  A. Mascareño, “La Cultura chilena como ficción real”, in: M. Figueroa & M. Vicuña (eds), El Chile del 
Bicentenario, (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2008), pp. 183-240. 15 
 
structures, in the sense that they tend to reduce volatility. As such, they have an 
“integrative effect”. An effect which is conditioned by the instrumental harmonisation 
of social structures through the purposeful construction of system-specific universes 
and the highly intrusive social engineering of the roles assigned to these universes, 
just as increased integration is conditioned by the constitution of boundaries, thereby 
leading to the paradox that increased integration among some elements only comes 
about through the increased exclusion of other elements. 
The above de-construction of the “old-European” (Alteuropäische) concepts of 
the totalising state, stratification and culture means that a functional equivalent to the 
concept of the nation-state is needed. Instead of nation-states, a concept of 
(national) configurations is more suitable. National configurations consist of a web of 
couplings between functionally-differentiated spheres, which partly, or completely, 
refer to the same territory. The foundational element of configurations is the mutual 
fixation of different systems, which produces an added value (mehrwert) in terms of 
societal integration. In addition, as the existence of disciplines such as comparative 
law and comparative politics illustrates, a variety of configurations exists in the sense 
that substantial differences can be observed between different configurations. 
Hence, although national configurations cannot be understood as being constituted 
through class struggle or upon the basis of a specific culture or national character 
(Volksgeist), the “additional value” which they produce implies, in contrast to the 
purely metaphorical status which they are granted within mainstream systems 
theory, that they must be understood as independent social phenomena. 
It is, however, important to understand that configurations are mainly 
constituted at the level of organisational systems, in so far as a  whole range of 
organisations, from constitutional courts and central banks to universities, serve as 
structural couplings between functional systems. Such couplings are, moreover, 
complemented by a whole range of regimes, which range from nationally-delineated 
corporatist labour market structures to national football leagues. Such regimes 
consist of a multiplicity of organisations (for example, trade unions and business 
organisations, or league of football clubs) as well as a broader set of stakeholders. In 
this sense, regimes can also be understood as structures which produce integration 
through the establishment of unity between leading roles and supportive roles, in 16 
 
other words, between producers and consumers, performers and audience, 
employers and employees, clerics and believers, and so forth. 
Thus, configurations can – to use a Leninist expression - also be described as 
“organisational societies” (Organizationsgesellschaften).
31
  The importance of the 
organisational dimension is underlined by the fact that it was the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth century organisational revolutions, emerging from the preceding military 
revolutions, which provided the basis for the political and economic revolutions which 
unfolded in the late Eighteenth century and throughout the Ninteenth
  century, 
thereby making the organisational revolutions, which unfolded within the political, as 
well as within the economic, sphere, the most important driving force leading to the 
establishment of the national configurations.
32
 The fact that functional sub-systems 
sail on a sea of organisations as well as the profound societal effects that this 
produces is, however, downplayed within mainstream systems theory,
33
  just as 
deliberative theory does not seem capture the pivotal importance of the 
organisational aspect of democracy, in the sense that the question of the 
organisational infrastructure of political communication remains radically under-
exposed within this strand of research.
34
It follows from the above re-construction of different aspects of Nineteenth 
and Twentieth century society that, under the condition of modernity, the kind of 
embeddedness which Polanyi departs from cannot be re-established. In modernity, 
the functional equivalent is, instead, a balancing of different functionally-delineated 
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spheres of society, such as, but not exclusively, the market and the (welfare-) state. 
In a multi-contextual society, the question of “social justice” is thereby transformed 
from a question of class conflict to the task of defining the social roles emerging 
within different spheres of society as well as the entrance criteria regulating the 
access to these roles. 
This development can also be illustrated by the move from corporatism to 
neo-corporatism. By the middle and late Twentieth century, the early forms of 
corporatism had evolved into neo-corporatist negotiation systems 
(Verhandlungssysteme) within Western European configurations. Neo-corporatist 
structures are hierarchically-organised “peak-associations” which mediate between 
their specific sectors of the economy and the state. In this sense, they bridge the gap 
between “state and society” or – to be more precise – between politics and economy, 
thereby producing the mutual stabilisation of the two spheres.
35
 These structures 
served as the central axis of co-ordination of national configurations, but were, at the 
same time, characterised by a move towards an ever-increasing reliance on 
functionally-delineated professions, which gradually made the earlier reference to the 
distinction between capital and labour and the social classes less profound. Thus, 
neo-corporatism can also be understood as a transitional phenomenon which 
bridges the gap between the Hegelian state-embedded society and the radical poly-
contextual society.
36
 
 
IV.   Equivalents in the Radicalised Modernity 
The emergence of national configurations must be understood as the result of highly-
complex and improbable evolutionary processes.
37
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  Improbably because such 
configurations are constituted through a mutual fixation of a whole range of 
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dimensions, in terms of functional systems, professions, regimes and organisations, 
in a manner which ensures the necessary autonomy of the dimensions at the same 
time that a “higher order” is established. The constitution through mutual fixation 
means that configurations are autonomous “universes” in so far as they derive their 
constitutive basis from the structure itself. They are assemblages
38
  of 
eigenstructures,
39
Indeed, such pressure can currently be observed because, sometime in the 
latter half of the Twentieth century, the economic system reached the limits of its 
expansion within the framework of (European) national configurations. This 
development transformed the national configurations from infrastructural elements 
facilitating economic reproduction into obstacles for further economic expansion.
  which represent different forms and dimensions for the 
reproduction of social patterns. Because they are mutually supportive, radical 
structural changes within one or more dimensions are, as a minimum, likely to create 
pressure for a re-organisation and an adjustment within other dimensions of the 
configuration, or, in extreme cases, to be fatal for the future viability of the 
configuration in question. 
40
This development is not, however, restricted to the economic sphere, in so far 
as similar developments can be observed within almost all spheres of society, 
ranging from the mass-media to science, which have also undergone a structural 
development, which implies increased emancipation from their boundedness within 
national configurations. The result is a structural drift towards a substitution of 
internal stabilisation mechanisms through territorial and stratificatory forms of 
differentiation with new forms of radically functionally-differentiated forms. 
Multinational companies, trade associations, fair trade groups, NGOs within areas 
such as human rights, environment and developing aid, universities and research 
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institutions, sport associations, and so on and so forth, increasingly establish new 
functionally-delineated normative orders which operate on a more or less global 
scale, and which are internally stabilised through new forms of (quasi-) legal 
structures.
41
  The fact that we are dealing with a co-evolutionary process which 
cannot be reduced to a question of pure economy
42
In the same manner as the modern states emerged from within the kind of 
pre-modern religiously-embedded structures which characterised the pre-modern 
world,
 is, moreover, being underlined 
by the fact that the political system, as well as the “traditional” legal structures, is 
also undergoing a globalisation process through the emergence of structures, such 
as the EU and the WTO, and many other international organisations, courts and 
tribunals. 
43
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  these new structures emerge from the structures constituting national 
configurations. Firms which used to operate on a national scale have become global, 
and classical international law organisations have increasingly developed a life of 
their own and thereby have gained a transnational dimension. Thus, multinational 
companies as well as international organisations must be understood as  two-
dimensional structures. In the case of multinationals, they often retain a national 
core, in the sense that they still count, for example, as German, Swiss, American or 
Japanese firms, which, to a great extent, remain structured by the national legal 
structures and the business culture of their country of origin. On the other hand, they 
are globally-operating structures with a need to develop products, organisational 
structures and policies, which are suitable for the entire globe. In this second sense, 
they must be understood as independent normative orders. As such, they are faced 
with a functional pressure to internally develop (quasi-) legal structures capable of 
stabilising such orders, as well as to develop polices capable of framing their 
42
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relations with stakeholders, in the form of consumers, distributors, sub-contractors 
and the wider public on a global scale.
44
  Thus, multinationals are neither just 
national-based companies nor free-flowing global entities. Instead, they are both at 
the same time.
45
The same is the case for international organisations. They remain treaty-
based and, as such, the political system in the nation-state form remains of central 
importance. Trans-national structures cannot, however, be understood as the result 
of pure delegation upon the basis of international treaties.
 
46
  Each delegation of 
competences implies recognition of the autonomy of the structure to which 
delegation is made, just as delegation implies a transfer of discretionary capacities, 
which enable them to select between varieties of possible operations. Selections of 
operations also tend to frame the variety of the possible operations that can be 
selected in the future. In this sense, delegation always implies a loss of control. 
Hence, delegation always represents a step into the unknown, which, at times, can 
release forces of surprising viability.
47
 For example, despite the massive efforts of 
the US government, in particular, to ensure inter-governmental control in the 
negotiation of the WTO agreement, the WTO regime has, nonetheless, developed 
into a dynamic autonomous structure, operating upon the basis of a specific logic, 
within a very short time-span.
48
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extremely multi-faceted structure with a life of its own. Thus, transnational structures 
can also be understood as parasites, in the sense that they rely on national-
configurations as their hosts, while, at the same time, tending to marginalise the 
hosts. But, potentially, they can also turn into parasitoids, namely into organisms 
which ultimately end up killing their hosts: for example, the EU, the most progressed 
transnational structure, is based upon an operational logic which systematically 
breaks down the very national constellations upon which it relies.
49
Thus, a continuum of trans-national structures ranging from public 
international organisations, hybrid private-public structures, to “pure” private forms 
has emerged.
 
50
A common feature of these structures is that they represent a move towards 
partial de-territorialisation, constituted through a mixture of “fluid” legal regimes with 
global reach and “forum shopping” between territorially-defined jurisdictions. Thus, 
even the EU, which, in principle, is a territorially-differentiated structure, does not, in 
many instances, refer to a concept of territoriality. Instead, it consists of a multitude 
of dimensions, such as The European Space of Freedom, Security and Justice and 
the European Economic Area, which indicate that the structures in question are not 
referring to territoriality in the nation-state sense, but that they are, instead, regimes 
which operate without well-defined boundaries.
  What we are witnessing is the emergence of a new form of 
configurations emerging “on top” of national configurations: configurations 
characterised by an independent logic and radically different institutional forms when 
compared with the national forms. 
51
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 The consequence is a weakening 
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of the link between law and national-based  forms of authority in the form of 
democratic processes, corporatist negotiation systems and so forth. The 
confinement to territorial boundaries, as inherent to the concept of a polity, is 
increasingly becoming an inadequate basis for problem-solving.
52
Thus, new forms of authority are emerging, in the sense that, within the 
transnational processes themselves, new authoritative structures, which evaluate the 
ongoing developments within their specific fields upon the basis of normative 
yardsticks, are emerging. The function of “scientific knowledge” within (public and 
private) risk regulation is a well-known example of this. But even NGOs within areas 
such as human rights (for example, Amnesty International  and  Human Rights 
Watch), fair trade (for example, the 24 organisations assembled within the 
framework of the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International structure) and the 
environment (for example, Greenpeace and the WWF) increasingly gain a position 
which enables them to act as the central source of authority for the normative 
evaluation of what appropriate standards should be established within their specific 
fields. 
 This is also being 
exemplified by the 2008 financial crisis, in the sense that reducing the imbalances of 
the economic system vis-à-vis  other spheres of society is likely to necessitate a 
further strengthening of transnational legal and political structures, rather than a 
return to nation-state forms of regulation. 
The consequence is a “disorder of normative orders”,
53
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 characterised by a 
multitude of overlapping partly-national and partly-trans-national structures, partly-
public and partly-private structures. Classical bureaucratic organisations to a large 
extent remain the organisational nucleus of these orders. This is the case in relation 
to purely national structures, international organisations, as well as multinational 
companies. But, at the same time, it is possible to observe the emergence of “buffer 
52
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zones” between the various orders, in the sense that organisational structures which 
rely on the network form “surround” virtually all hierarchical structures, be it in the 
form of inter-state networks between nation state bureaucracies,
54
 or in the form of 
Comitology or Social Corporate Responsibility structures in the form of partnerships 
between, for example, research institutions and firms. The function of such networks 
is the transfer of meaning components (Sinnkomponente) from one order to another. 
Thus, networks are neither the basic components of society,
55
 nor are they “mini-
systems” which, themselves, are functionally-differentiated.
56
This “in-between” status means that they lack the “purity” of functional 
systems. Thus, they are doubled-edged structures which can provoke, on the one 
hand, de-differentiation, and, on the other, structures which serve as channels of 
reflexivity which increases the ability to observe external developments, thereby 
increasing the possibility of adaptation. They are the social forms “... where co-
operation and trust and domination and compliance are actually produced”.
  Instead, they are 
structures which stand transverse to the functionally-differentiated structures of 
society. In this sense, they can also be understood as functional equivalents to the 
(neo-) corporatist  structures which have emerged as a consequence of radical 
increases in complexity and functional differentiation. 
57
 Their 
function is to combine a multitude of rationalities. For example, within risk regulation, 
networks combine scientific, environmental, and economic, as well as legal, forms of 
rationality.
58
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 They are the no-man’s-land between functional systems, and, as such, 
they are the political battlefields upon which the continued struggle for the 
appropriate delineation of meaning spheres is fought out. The move towards 
increased reliance  on functional differentiation implies a transformation of the 
function of politics, in the sense that the transnational layer of the political system, 
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which continuously gains in importance vis-à-vis the nation-state layer, is oriented 
towards such functional-delineated conflicts, rather than towards territorial or class-
related conflicts. An appropriate conceptualisation of transnational structures is, 
therefore, conditioned by the development of a new context-specific concept of the 
political; a concept,  which, however, can only be developed upon the basis of a 
radical break with the Weberian concept of the political, which continues to guide the 
contemporary nation state disciplines of social science, and which exercises 
systematic methodological sabotage  vis-à-vis  attempts to understand the political 
character of the transnational space. 
As networks are not only the forms through which reflexivity is increased, but 
also serve as channels of access through which asymmetries can be transformed 
into colonising tendencies, the danger of instrumentalisation is omnipresent. This 
danger is being increased by the structural tendency to closure, which characterises 
most networks. Such closure is not only the result of hegemonic battles, but also a 
reflection of an  organisational need of stability, which again leads to the 
establishment of narratives, unchallenged assumptions, considered to be self-
evident truths, and circular recruitment, in which only those who confirm the already-
established world-view can obtain  access. These structural deficits highlight the 
potential role of law vis-à-vis  the network phenomenon, in the sense that 
constitutionalisation and proceduralisation can serve as tools which are deployed in 
order to ensure symmetry, discursive diversity and continued openness. The 
differences between the operational mode of comitology structures, which rely on a 
detailed procedural framework, and the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) 
processes are very illustrative, in so far as the absence of a formalised legal 
framework creates a structural basis for the de-differentiation processes within the 
latter.
59
The challenge to legal scholarship thus seems to be the endeavour to take 
these European experiences into the global setting, as well as to develop a 
framework which makes it possible to seek a constitutionalisation of private 
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governance structures of the kind surrounding multinational companies as well. Such 
an endeavour will, however, have to go beyond classical public and private 
international law. If one insists on national legal structures and international law, 
understood as an “in-between nations” form of law, to be the only law, then, the 
consequence is that one would have to accept a “legal gap”, in the sense that 
substantial areas of society - and thus of the social reality of individuals - will remain 
beyond the law. Although nation-state law remains central and might serve as a “law 
of last resort”,
60
 a “complete constitutionalisation” implies the need to develop new 
legal structures which reflect the structural reality of a society in which substantial 
societal processes unfold beyond nation configurations.
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